Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict – Alan Robock

Dr. Alan Robock has been one of the leading authorities on Nuclear Winter theory for many years. He maintains an excellent web site on this subject here: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/nuclear/

He and Brain Toon (one of the original authors of the TTAPS study*) prepared a new review of Nuclear Winter for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists here (PDF) which demonstrates the danger of Nuclear Winter is still present, that the science behind the theory still stands up and that threshold of triggering climatic change from using nuclear weapons is still extremely low.

*Title: Nuclear winter: global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions, Author(s):T.P. Ackerman , J.B. Pollack , Carl Sagan , O.B. Toon and R.P. Turco, Source:Science. 222 (Dec. 23, 1983): p1283.

Threads—Select References and Bibliography by Kevin Hall

The following reference material was used in BBC nuclear war drama “Threads” either as a factual or dramatic reference. Many of the references were used to either substantiate the on-screen captions and news reports, or were used to approximate casualty, fall-out or blast effects or to simulate the events after the attack.

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Reappraisal of the “Stay Put” Policy – 1983

In an article in The Guardian (July 11, 1983; Page: 3 “Nuclear War Evacuations Planned“) there is a brief note on how the Civil Contingencies Unit of the Home Office (UK) was rethinking traditional advice on staying put on the event of a nuclear crisis:

“It is the first indication that the Government is thinking of reversing its traditional Civil Defence Advice for people to stay where they are.”

This re-examination of the “Stay Put” policy tells us several things; the first is that the government does expect to fight a limited nuclear war: as the advice considers telling those who live near major military bases in East Anglia and Scotland to evacuate.

It tells us also that the bases do actually make these areas targets for an attack – something incredibly yet frequently denied, tacitly admits deterrence might fail and that the stay-put policy was condemning millions to death if a nuclear war ever broke out.

Yet, as is always the case with civil defence in the nuclear era it tries to reconcile many contradictory points:

“Stay at Home”

As was hammered home in Protect and Survive Stay at Home was a key message. The internal logic of Protect and Survive said that because of fall-out:

…no part of the United Kingdom will be safer than any other…

Which depending on the scale of the attack is absolutely true. Regardless of any ulterior motive for insisting civilians to stay at home, the truth is that the path of fall-out is unpredictable and it could drift anyway (however areas effected by fire and blast can be more reasonably assumed – major industrial areas are probably more at risk than empty fields).

Evacuations Incompatible with Mutual Assured Destruction

If there was still any truth to the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction 1983 anything that encompasses large scale evacuations is an anathema to it. As Gwynne Dyer puts it in Notes on Nuclear War mutual assured destruction only works if each side are kept as helpless hostages to the other’s weapons. Any sign of civil defence in the form of evacuations could cause the other side to push the pre-emptive nuclear button.

Where Would We Go?

Unlike large land masses like the United States or Russia, the question for the UK is where would we go? In the theoretical but largely plausible attack in Operation Square Leg or attack “H” in Openshaw’s Doomsday, the areas of the United Kingdom not effected by at least 1PSI of overpressure, blast, fire or all three are pretty small. Parts of the West Country, central and northern Wales and northern Scotland are the least effected by these hazards however they also have some of the lowest housing density and food reserves.

Although trying to crowd millions of these people in small parts of the UK may offer some small amount of protection for an initial attack (although in practical terms doing so would be nearly impossible and would be a strong signal for war) the lack of shelter, food and protection from fall-out could quickly erode any minor gains.